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COMMENT
EFFICIENCY, MORALITY, AND RIGHTS:
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "CLEANING UP"
THOMAS MORAWETZ*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The ultimate challenge in moral theory is to find a single criterion for moral judgment, a criterion that reconciles disparate
moral intuitions and gives guidance in the solution of moral
dilemmas. Such a criterion would have to be simultaneously descriptive and normative. It would have to fit and explain moral
intuitions and at the same time represent a standard for correctness in moral judgment. Many contemporary writers despair of finding such a criterion and some argue that the task
itself is impossible.1 According to Lloyd Cohen, even Richard
Posner fears to tread the high ground of moral metatheory in
his original formulation of the wealth maximization criterion.2
Professor Cohen's article, A Justification of Social Wealth Maximization as a Rights Based Ethical Theory,3 is therefore remarkably
ambitious. It aims to accomplish several jobs, including the development of an all-encompassing moral metatheory, with brief
and efficient arguments. The arguments are imaginative as well
as efficient.
Professor Cohen's argument has several steps. (a) Social
wealth maximization (as a moral criterion) does indeed fit our
moral intuitions. (b) Social wealth maximization can also serve
as an ultimate moral justification, one that explains our moral
intuitions. (c) Contrary to general understanding, social wealth
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. A.B., Harvard College;J.D., Yale Law School; M. Phil., Yale University; Ph.D. (Philosophy), Yale University. I wish to thank my research assistant, Paul Callagy, for editorial help on this paper.
I. Among the most prominent and influential writers who have discussed this view
are B. WILLIAMS, ETHics AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985) (especially chapters 2,
9, and 10); T. NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986) (especially chapters 9-11); A.
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981) (chapters 1-5).
2. "Judge Posner's original formulation of this theory was not grounded on any fundamental moral justification. Rather, he argued that the correspondence between social wealth maximization and moral intuitions is an empirical fact ...." Cohen, A
Justification of Sodal Wealth Maximization as a Rights-Based Ethical Theory, 10 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 411, 411 (1987). This is Lloyd Cohen's characterization of Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
3. Supra note 2.
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maximization is a rights-based as well as a goal-based moral theory. This can be demonstrated by showing that the Golden
Rule is in accord with the social wealth maximization theory.
(d) Moral intuitions about so-called "cleaning up" examples illustrate the congruence between the Golden Rule and wealth
maximization, and are generalizable to other moral intuitions.
In Section II of this paper I shall look briefly at each of these
claims to see what would be necessary to establish it and
whether Professor Cohen succeeds in doing so.
In Section III I shall offer some more general observations
about the kind of enterprise Professor Cohen undertakes. How
does one set about offering a moral criterion and explaining
moral reasoning? What counts as an explanation, and what are
the data to be explained?
II.

WEALTH MAXIMIZATION AND RIGHTS

Professor Cohen is correct in thinking that the sharpest challenge to a theory of wealth maximization as a moral criterion is
posed by the notion of rights.4 In its most abstract form, the
challenge is that the common foundation of any moral theory is
respect for the needs and dignity of persons, that the raison
d'etre of the practice of morality is a commitment to the view
that certain ways of treating persons are unacceptable, deserving of blame and condemnation. 5 This is characteristically expressed in the language of rights or entitlements. The notion of
moral wrong, however, extends beyond violations of rights.
Many ways of treating persons are morally criticizable even
when they do not rise to the level of violations of rights. For
example, one may be criticized morally as being inconsiderate,
cowardly, selfish, and so on. These are moral criticisms, but
they have little basis in any claim of right. Moreover, most ways
of treating persons in a morally praiseworthy way go beyond
observing their rights and entitlements. Kindness, generosity,
and heroism are all positive moral attributes that involve supererogatory conduct on the part of the actor. A theory of rights,
therefore, is not a general theory of morality.
4. Cohen, supra note 2, at 415.
5. This has not always been the basic motivating conception of moral philosophy,
and it can be criticized even within the constraints of modem philosophy as leaving
little room for consideration of virtue and the well-lived life. These latter concerns
were, in the conviction of many commentators, the focus of ancient moral philosophy.
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A discussion of a "criterion for morality" must therefore begin by acknowledging that there are indefinitely many terms of
moral evaluation, from such general terms as "good" and
"bad" and "right" and "wrong" to such specific terms of praise
and blame as "courageous," "generous," "thoughtless," and
"vicious." Each term surely has its own criteria for use.6 Professor Cohen, in his search for a criterion, regrettably gives no
indication which of the disparate terms of moral discourse and
judgment he is trying to analyze. One has to assume he is talking about "good" and "bad" or "praiseworthy" and "blameworthy" in general.' Thus, if wealth maximization were a
general moral criterion, its congruence with intuitions about
rights would involve only part of its scope.
(a) The first part of Professor Cohen's argument takes up a
descriptive rather than a normative task. He defends the view
that wealth maximization as a moral criterion fits our moral intuitions. In later parts of his article he argues not only that it
fits, but also that it stands as a justification. The most straightforward way of demonstrating fit would be to take representative moral intuitions, in especially difficult counterexamples,
and to show that the theory accommodates such counterexamples. Presumably anticipating that this is a potentially endless8
and therefore inconclusive task, Professor Cohen does not
even start. Instead he tries to establish fit in three indirect ways.
The first way rests heavily on Richard Posner's argument for
wealth maximization as a moral criterion.9 Judge Posner, as
Professor Cohen represents him, argues that utilitarianism and
Kantianism represent alternative ways of accounting for moral
intuitions and that both fail badly. It is hard to see what this
argument by Professor Cohen establishes because it is defective in many ways. For one thing, it rests on a caricature of utili6. If this were not true, the terms would all be synonyms.
7. In fact it is hard to know what to say-and the relevant difficulties permeate the
literature on morality and wealth maximization. It is rarely clear whether the supposed
congruence is said to implicate all of moral reasoning or some specially important
branch of it. If it is the latter, the boundaries of the moral analysis are hardly ever made

clear.
8. One way, the characteristic way, of foreshortening the process is to demonstrate

that difficult apparent counterexamples can be accomodated. Because he assumes congruence, Professor Cohen does not take this route.
9. See Posner, supra note 2, at 119-35.Judge Posner's discussion of utilitarianism and
Kantianism is at id- at 111-19. My remarks throughout this Comment are not intended
as an examination or critique ofJudge Posner's article but only of Professor Cohen's
rendering of it and of Professor Cohen's independent arguments.
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tarianism, in which morality is held to equal the maximization
of pleasure. Jeremy Bentham, to be sure, interpreted the maximization of pleasure as the highest good, but it is likely that by
"pleasure" he meant something more like well-being.10 No
Twentieth Century defender of utilitarianism takes seriously
the notion that pleasurable Stimulation or arousal (the sense of
"pleasure" with which Professor Cohen saddles utilitarianism"1 ) is to be maximized.' 2 Also, the Cohen-Posner characterization of Kantianism bears no resemblance to views held by
Kant or his followers.1 3 Moreover, the logic of Professor Cohen's argument is defective. Even if he could show that a noncaricatured form of utilitarianism or Kantianism is a defective
representation of moral intuitions, this would not begin to imply that wealth maximization is less defective. This would be
like saying that if a snow plow and a tractor are both defective
tools for brain surgery, and if a meat cleaver is different from
both a snow plow and a tractor, then a meat cleaver is a fit tool
4
for brain surgery.'
Professor Cohen's second indirect way of establishing the fit
between wealth maximization and moral intuitions is to argue
that because wealth maximization produces results that fit
10. For examples, see R. HARRISON, BENTHAM 106-94 (1983) (chapters 5-7).
11. See Cohen, supra note 2, at 413-14 & n.9.
12. See, e.g., A. SEN & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (1982); R. G. FREY,
UTILITY AND RIGHTS (1984); H. MILLER & W. WILLIAMS, THE LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM
(1982).
13. It is one thing to say that Kant does not satisfactorily address all modem questions about the distinction between acting and omitting to act, but it is something else
to say that he believes that inaction is never culpable. Moreover, the notion of a categorical imperative, an imperative without exceptions, is implausible only if the imperative is crudely sketched (in the way thatJudge Posner and Professor Cohen sketch it).
The norms that one is able and willing to universalize as categorical imperatives may be
of great complexity: The implications of the categorical imperative for lying and torturing are not simply that one is enjoined from lying and torturing tout court. Rather the
categorical imperative implies that one is never justified in lying or torturing except in
those circumstances in which one would accede to being the victim of lies and torture
oneself. To be sure, Kant's treatment of examples is often misleading, but Judge Posner and Professor Cohen carry lack of charity in interpretation to an extreme. See discussions of Kant's ethics in B. AUNE, KANT'S THEORY OF MORALS (1979) (especially
chapters II and III); KANT: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS (R. Wolff 1967) (especially pages 211-338).
14. The missing (implausible) premise is that there are only three possible moral
theories, utilitarianism, Kantianism, and wealth maximization theory. Not only is it implausible that they are the only three candidates, but also it is not at all clear that they
are each put forth to address the same questions or the same phenomena. Thus, when
Professor Cohen says "[t]herefore, it is at least in the class of potentially explanatory
and informative moral theories," Cohen, supra note 2, at 415, he is using a process that
involves a logical howler.
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moral intuitions in easy cases, one can validly presume that it
will produce satisfactory results in hard cases. 5 Again, there
are three problems here. First, Professor Cohen gives no indication what he means by the distinction between hard and easy
cases. Are easy cases ones about which persons feel strongly, or
ones that are non-controversial (whether or not they generate
strong feelings), or ones that illuminate wealth maximization
particularly clearly? 16 Different answers to this question would
place the analysis in very different lights. Second, what justifies
Professor Cohen's premise that wealth maximization clearly fits
the easy cases? A general right of assembly and free speech, in
all situations that are not likely to provoke violence, is widely
recognized as a basic moral right. Such a right prevails even in
situations where the exercise of free speech can be shown (empirically) to frustrate the processes of free trade and free bargaining, even when such social protest "gums up" the works of
the economy. Is this an easy case or not?' 7 Third, the logic of
the argument at this point is again defective. One can rarely
infer that because a tool works in easy cases, it can therefore be
counted on to work in hard cases. A defective tool may be just
the sort that works only until it is severely tested-an oven that
works fine for bread and casseroles may not be adequate for
the occasional souffle.
Finally, Professor Cohen's third point about fit is simply an
appeal to authority. He contends that "[n]o critic has yet produced a successful refutation"" s to the claim that moral intuitions fit the criterion of wealth maximization. Because
Professor Cohen does not survey the very extensive literature
that claims to do exactly that,'" it is hard to know whether he is
unacquainted with it or whether he merely fails to find it "con15. See id. at 414-15.

16. By the first criterion (strong feelings) the plight of the homeless presents a easy
moral case for public relief; by the second criterion (controversiality) the case may be
hard or easy and by the third criterion a public policy of non-protectionism is an easy
moral example, notwithstanding the fact that it is controversial and that some would
regard it as not involving morality at all.
17. As I discuss below, Professor Cohen's attention to rights extends only to procedural rights like fair treatment and impartiality rather than substantive rights. His position on substantive rights is not clear at all.
18. Cohen, supra note 2, at 418 & n.26.
19. Professor Cohen suggests that no one has put forth interesting counter suggestions. There are, however, many attempts to do this. See Privacy and Economics, 12 GA. L.
REV. 393 (1978) (symposium); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFsTRA L.
REV. 485 (1980).
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vincing." One prevailing theme of the critical literature is that
distributional considerations are crucial to our moral intuitions
and that the criterion of wealth maximization fails to take them
into account. In other words, it is morally significant how the
parties to a transaction are initially situated and whether their
behavior is, for example, constrained by exigency or misperception.2 0 A defender of a wealth maximization criterion
must show how his theory takes their moral relevance into account or, alternatively, why they do not need to be taken into
account.
This failure to show congruence between the wealth maximization criterion and moral intuitions weakens Professor Cohen's argument but is in fact tangential. On one hand, the
failure can be offset by a showing that his "cleaning up" examples show congruence and are generalizable to other examples
of moral intuitions. I shall consider this argument in subsection
(d).2" On the other hand, Professor Cohen's main concern is
metaethical. He claims that wealth maximization is as much a
rights-based as a goal-based theory, and it is to this claim that I
must now turn.
(b) What is the particular conceptual difficulty involved in arguing that wealth maximization is rights-based? Why have writers such as Professor Dworkin 22 and others 23 resisted such a
suggestion ab initio?
All rights-based theories have a common motivation. The
motivation can be explained in terms of four facts. The first is
that every individual, in principle, is vulnerable to harm by
other individuals and by the state. The second fact is that the
state, insofar as it involves a monopoly of power, can in principle deploy its power to minimize or at least alleviate harm to
persons. The third fact is that the state, in a more general way,
20. One pervasive difficulty in understanding the project of defending the wealth
maximization criterion is in determining whether it is about decisions or transactions
on the macroscopic or microscopic level. Professor Rawls is clearly concerned with
setting general rules or constraints for society and his enterprise is clearly macroscopic.
In fact he cautions his readers that his principles ofjustice are not relevant to individual
bargains or other decisions. Professor Cohen makes no such distinction. With regard to
the moral parameters of individual bargains, the constraints of exigency, mistake, and
so on, are surely relevant. SeeJ. RAwLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 3-117 (1971) (chapters 1
and 2).
21. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
22. R. DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 237-89 (1985) (part 4).

23. See Privacy and Economics, supra note 19; Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern,
supra note 19.
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sets and maintains many of the conditions under which individuals live and may in doing so affect lives beneficially or
harmfully. And, finally, the fourth fact is that in practice individuals will be variously situated, some in a position to take
care of their needs and interests with their own resources and
others in a position of vulnerability and actual need.
Any theory of rights will have two constraints, one concerned
with the recognition of needs and with the maintenance of
minimally acceptable well-being, and the other concerned with
freedom and liberty and the optimal conditions in which individuals define and realize personal goals. These constraints allow room, of course, for an infinite array of theories, and
Professor Rawls and Professor Dworkin offer two among many
possible ways of conceptualizing these constraints and tensions
between individuals and the state.2 4 What any theory of rights
cannot do, it seems to me, is to turn its back on these tensions
and proceed as if they did not exist.
The most abstract yet simple criticism of a theory of wealth
maximization is that it assumes away the tension by making two
implausible assumptions. The first assumption is that in a system of wealth maximization all individuals will be more or
less 25 optimally and equally situated to realize their preferences; the second is that one who is optimally situated to realize his preferences is thereby optimally situated to realize his
rights. The first of these assumptions is one rejected by Professor Rawls and Professor Dworkin, among others. It involves,
they argue, the fallacy that what benefits the collectivity necessarily benefits its individual members, the fallacy of regarding
individuals as component and perhaps interchangeable parts of
the whole. 26 The second assumption brings the entire analysis
24. Professor Rawls's principles ofjustice are an attempt to distinguish morally justifled from morally unjustified interventions by the state into the lives of persons. Only
interventions that fit the principles ofjustice are justified. The strategy of seeking "reflective equilibrium" is the strategy of comparing intuitions with general principles and
revising the principles until there is a match, until counterexamples are accommodated. See J. RAwLs, supra note 20, at 48-51. Professor Dworkin's derivation of rights
from the principle of concern and respect for others is in some ways derivative from
Professor Rawls and in other ways distinguishable. See R. DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 150-205 (1978) (chapters 6 and 7). Chapter 6 is an analysis of Professor
Rawls's theory.
25. The underlying assumption may be that tinkering with the rules to eliminate
inequities resulting from idiosyncratic situations will, on balance, only make things
worse.
26. SeeJ. RAWLs, supra note 20, at 23-28; R. DWORKUN, supra note 24, at 94-100.
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within the domain of morality. In itself, a system of preference
satisfaction is not a moral system. Once preference satisfaction
is linked to rights, it assumes moral relevance.27
Where does Professor Cohen stand in regard to these assumptions? His main argument is neither, as we have already
seen, a congruence argument (that moral intuitions are congruent with wealth maximization goals) nor an argument that the
goals of the collectivity are the same as the goals of the individual members. Methodologically he begins with the individual
rather than the collectivity. He is concerned to establish that
from the individual's standpoint, wealth maximization as a personal principle of action and as a principle of decision-making
for the collectivity coincides with his intuitions about what is
moral. In other words, he does not try very hard to show that
wealth maximization is simultaneously a personal principle of
action and a principle of political or social or institutional decision-making. He presumes this and thus makes the same first
assumption that, as we have seen, Professor Rawls, Professor
Dworkin, and others reject and criticize. 28 Rather, he tries to
buttress the second assumption, that for the individual wealth
maximization as a principle of action is justified by moral intuitions and justifies them in turn. 29 In making this argument, he
limits his palette to moral intuitions about rights.3 0
Professor Cohen thus sidesteps the most difficult problem
about rights. If society (or the state) is not the individual writ
large, if rights-talk arises only from the recognition that society
(or the state) is an artificial entity that functions in part to mediate among conflicting individual projects and between the indi27. Both Professor Rawls and Professor Dworkin do assume that preference satisfac-

tion is in general to be respected and maximized by a system of morality. This is what

in Professor Rawls's work motivates the hypothesis of the "original position" in which
persons express their general preferences about the structure of institutions. See J.
RAwLs, supra note 20, at 118-92 (chapter 3). Professor Dworkin's discussions of liberty
are motivated by the desirability of a system in which persons are best able to realize
preferences and goals. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 24, at 240-65 (chapters 10 and 11);
R. DWORKIN, supra note 22, at 205-33 (part 3).
28. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
29. Professor Cohen compares his own and Judge Posner's account of the strategy
of reflective equilibrium with that used by Professor Rawls. He obscures the important
differences. Professor Rawls is concerned with the mutual modifiability of intuitions
and theoretical formulations in the light of reflective comparisons. Inherent in this process of reflection is relative uncertainty and unclarity about the emerging complex rules
of justice. The norm of wealth maximization is not treated by Professor Cohen or
Judge Posner as subject to reflective modifiability in the same way.
30. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.

No. 2]

Comment: Wealth Maximization

vidual and the state, then it is highly implausible that the same
principles that guide the individual in decision-making should
also guide the state. Is wealth maximization the principle that
does and should guide the individual, or the principle that does
and should guide public policy? Professor Cohen, following
Judge Posner, appears at the beginning of his essay to be talking about public policy, and this is reinforced by his emphasis
on rights, a notion usually generated by thinking about the individual and the state. On the other hand, virtually all of his
arguments are about the way the individual conceives the aims
and moral justification of his actions, and I am forced to assume that that is Professor Cohen's chief, if covert, concern.
(c) Professor Cohen tries to show that social wealth maximization is a rights-based moral theory in two ways, first by
showing that intuitions about wealth maximization coincide
,ith the Golden Rule, and second by showing that this coincidence is exemplified in "cleaning up" examples. I shall be concerned with the first point in this subsection.
The classic formulation of the Golden Rule is "Do unto
others as you would have them do unto you."'" On its face, the
rule says nothing about rights. One might argue that it is tacitly
about rights with the following reasoning. All accounts of value
are, logically, either teleological-consequentialist-accounts
that locate the value of an act in the value of the goals it is
intended to achieve-or deontological-accounts that maintain
that an act can have value in itself regardless of its consequences. The Golden Rule seems to be deontological: An act is
valuable (or morally correct, or good) if it is done in the spirit
of the Golden Rule regardless of its consequences. The concept of rights is also a deontological concept: The satisfaction
of rights is good in itself. None of this shows however that the
Golden Rule has anything to do with rights. All it shows is that
both are deontological concepts. We must assume therefore
that Professor Cohen is using a variant of the Golden Rule,
perhaps "Others have a right to be treated by you as you would
wish to be treated by them." 2
31. The most commonly cited formulations of the Golden Rule trace their origin to
the Bible, Matthew 7:12.
32. Most commentators regard the Golden Rule as an account of the notion of
moral goodness and moral considerateness in general. They would resist transformation of it into a rule about rights; the transformation is itself counterintuitive.
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What could this reformulated rule mean? There seem to be
three possibilities. The least plausible possibility is that, given
one's particular and idiosyncratic wishes regarding the conduct
of others, one has a duty to do similar things for them. If you
want others to invite you to baseball games, you have a duty to
invite them to baseball games (whether they like baseball or
not). This is silly both because any sensible rule would make
reference to the wishes of others and because it is hard to see
how wishes can in themselves give rise to duties. The second
possibility remedies at least the first of these two defects. It
says, if you want others to satisfy your wishes, you have a duty
to gratify their wishes. This formulation, like the first, seems to
elevate what is at best a counsel of prudence ("If you want
others to favor you, it would be wise to favor them") into a duty
without any justification for doing so. The third possibility is
the most plausible because it is the most general. It says that
anyone who wishes to be treated fairly and without partiality by
others has a duty to treat them fairly and without partiality. In
this form, the Golden Rule surely makes sense as a basis of duties and rights. What are its implications?
The right to fair and impartial treatment is in some ways a
very weak and a very special right. It is a formal right rather
than a substantive right, such as the right to minimal subsistence, security, or free speech and assembly." It simply says
that whatever the governing rules are, they should be applied
with regard to the prescribed criteria of decision rather than
other, possibly arbitrary and irrelevant, criteria. Any rule can be
applied fairly or unfairly.
Interpreted in this way, the Golden Rule and the right to fair
and impartial treatment are compatible with seriously immoral
conduct. The person who is willing to take his chances in a
Hobbesian state of nature simply satisfies the Golden Rule by
respecting a situation in which all are subject to the anarchy of
a state of nature. The person who is willing to participate in a
regimen of cruelty and exploitation satisfies the Rule by respecting the right of all to participate equally in mutual cruelty
and exploitation. This observation has led commentators to say
33. The distinction between substantive and formal rights is not always sharp. The
formal right to impartial and fair treatment is sometimes said to represent the (putative) equal right of persons to respect and dignity. The latter right seems to bridge
formal and substantive rights.
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that Kant's categorical imperative is purely formal and empty of
content, and that Kant must make substantive assumptions
about desires and attitudes in order to generate a recognizably
moral position. 4 Similarly Professor Rawls must make many
assumptions about the dispositions of persons in the "original
position" before he can generate rules ofjustice, and in making
these assumptions he opens himself up to criticism.3 5
The implications of all this for Professor Cohen's argument
is that, in appealing to the Golden Rule and to the putative
rights that flow from it, he does not begin to touch on the violations of substantive rights that, according to critics, flow from a
regime of wealth maximization. All he demonstrates is that the
norm of wealth maximization should be applied fairly rather
than unfairly. One may accept this conclusion and maintain
that wealth maximization is incompatible with the recognition
of substantive rights and therefore diverges from moral intuitions. Professor Cohen compares the generation of the norm
of wealth maximization with the generation of principles ofjustice in Professor Rawls's work.3 ' The differences are very important. The persons in Professor Cohen's or Judge Posner's
equivalent to the "original position" are said to adhere only to
the Golden Rule, only to the moral ideal of fair and impartial
treatment. This intuition, as Professor Rawls recognizes, 3 7 cannot be treated as a full-fledged account of rights but only as the
beginning of one. By assuming that he is dealing with a full and
sturdy account of rights when he is not doing so, Professor Cohen makes his job of reconciling wealth maximization and
rights much easier than it really is.
(d) Professor Cohen argues that so-called "cleaning up" examples show the coincidence of rights and wealth maximization
as moral norms. He does this by parading them as instances of
34. See Ebbinghaus, Interpretationand Misinterpretationof the Categorical Imperative, in
KANT: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS, supra note 13, at 211; Harrison, Kant's Examples of the First Formulationof the CategoricalImperative, in KANT: A COLLECTION OF CRrrICAL
ESSAYS, supra note 13, at 228; Kemp, Kant's Examples of the CategoricalImperative, in KANT:
A COLLECTION OF CRrnCAL ESSAYS, supra note 13, at 246.
35. See Daniels, Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty, in READING RAWLS 253 (N.
Daniels ed. 1974); Hart, Rawls on Liberty and its Priority, in id at 230; Barber, Justifying
Justice: Problems of Psychology, Politics and Measurement in Rawls, in id. at 292; Michelman,
Constitutional Welfare Rights and A Theory ofJustice, in id. at 319; Sen, Rawls Versus Bentham: An Axiomatic Examination of the Price DistributionProblem, in id. at 283; Miller, Rawls
and Marxism, in id. at 206; Scanlon, Rawls' Threoiy ofJustice, in id. at 169.
36. Cohen, supra note 2, at 417-20.

37. J. RAWLS, supra note 20, at 195-200.
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the Golden Rule, using the Golden Rule (as we have seen) as a
link between the concept of rights and wealth maximization,
and claiming that "cleaning up" examples are generalizable to
other moral intuitions. The claim of generalizability is crucial
to his discussion.
Professor Cohen considers two examples of "cleaning up,"
the serial use of a bathroom and the serial use of a classroom
blackboard. In both cases one may adopt either a rule that one
should always clean up after use, giving the new user a clean
facility, or that the new user should have the burden of cleaning
up before use. One may also adopt no rule at all and leave the
matter to personal preference. Professor Cohen contends that
these examples show the coincidence of wealth maximization
and moral intuitions about rights: Implementation of the
Golden Rule-whereby each user has a duty to prepare the facility in the way he would wish it to be prepared-results in
maximal preference satisfaction, and preference satisfaction is
equivalent to wealth maximization . 8 There are several odd features of this argument.
(1) One peculiarity of the examples is that they seem to be
situations in which most persons would not want to have rules
and would not consider rights and duties to be relevant. In the
blackboard example, perceptions of convenience and courtesy
are so variable and the inconveniences so minor that any imposition of rules creating rights and duties would be more trouble
than they would be worth. In the bathroom example, preferences may be stronger and failure to "clean up" may be blameworthy but there is the same disinclination to think in terms of
rights and duties. I suspect that Professor Cohen is drawn to
these examples because he thinks they demonstrate the relevance of fairness. What they really show is that fairness as a
procedural right usually accompanies the assertion of substantive rights.3 9
(2) Although preference satisfaction is a factor in "cleaning
up" examples, such examples are peculiarly ones in which gen38. Cohen, supra note 2, at 428-3 1.
39. The procedural right to fair and impartial treatment should be distinguished
from other procedural rights, for example the rights of those accused of crime as set
down in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
These rights are justified as a way of spelling out the constraints of fair treatment but
they are a specific crystallization of those constraints. They are tied to the substantive
right not to be deprived of liberty without due process.
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eral preference satisfaction has nothing to do with wealth maximization. The paradigm of wealth maximization theory is the
bargain between parties, a transaction conducted on the basis
of perceived needs and preferences, with each party emerging
from the transaction better off. The infinite series of such transactions produces wealth maximization. "Cleaning up" examples on the other hand are not bargains or transactions but
serial solitary decisions, and they are decisions about returning
part of one's environment to its status quo ante use. While each
actor may have preferences with regard to cleaning up, it does
not follow (in these examples, peculiarly) that the actor whose
preferences have been satisfied therefore emerges from the
process better off. These decisions involve system maintenance
rather than any possible cumulation of benefits (or goods, or
wealth).
(3) Two moral intuitions seem relevant to "cleaning up" examples. The first is that whatever rule is adopted should be applied fairly and equitably, without partiality. In other words,
each party should respect the Golden Rule in this context. The
second is that if one rule is generally perceived to be less onerous than another, the less onerous rule is to be adopted. Thus,
if cleaning up after bathroom use is less objectionable or unpleasant than cleaning up before use, the first rule is the one to
be chosen.
These two moral intuitions are so general that they can be
generated by almost any moral examples at all. As we have already seen, they under-determine morality. They amount, respectively, to the intuition that a system of morality should be
fair and impartial and the intuition that, other things being
equal, a moral system should respect individual preferencesand work to realize them. The first intuition is weak because
fairness is only a formal constraint and all kinds of rules and
procedures can be immoral substantively and still be fair.4' The
second intuition is weak for a different reason. A belief that a
moral system must operate to produce preference satisfaction
is subject to two qualifications by the nature of morality itself.
For one thing individuals must be equally positioned to effect
their preferences. Otherwise those who are better positioned,
40. A confiscatory tax that deprives all persons of ninety percent of their earnings
can be morally unjustifiable but fairly administered. A system of random torture in
which victims are selected by lot may also be said to be fair.
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those who have greater power and wealth ab initio, will be likely
to exploit and victimize those who are relatively powerless. For
another thing there is always the possibility of "false consciousness," of self-delusion. Preferences are to be honored only to
the extent that they are likely to redound to the good of the
actor. To be sure, most actors most of the time are the best
judges of what is good for them, but that is a far cry from saying that on principle and conceptually all actors are the best
judges and none are ever self-deluded.4 1
The major oddity of "cleaning up" examples is that relevant
differences in power are hard to imagine4 2 (because situations
do not involve bargains or transactions) and preferences in
these cases are unlikely to diverge from correct perceptions of
benefit (because benefit in these cases amounts to convenience
or inconvenience and that is a matter of subjective judgment).
"Cleaning up" examples are thus poor vehicles for raising the
deeper and most obvious moral objections to wealth maximization through preference satisfaction as a moral ideal.
It is hard to see how "cleaning up" examples can play a significant role in the kind of argument Professor Cohen claims to
give. They have little, if anything, to do with rights or with
wealth maximization. To the extent that they do have anything
to do with the Golden Rule or with preference satisfaction, they
exemplify certain obvious necessary conditions of moral behavior but they tell us nothing about what is sufficient for morality.
And almost any other examples would do as well.
III.

ON THE GENERAL IDEA OF A JUSTIFICATION OF MORALITY

The general problem that Professor Cohen claims to be addressing is one of the most venerable and justifiably central issues of philosophy, that is to say, of human self-understanding.
By way of exploring some methodological land-mines that lie
buried in this well-trod ground, I shall comment briefly on two
41. One underlying issue is whether paternalistic legislation is ruled out in principle
or whether, on the other hand, paternalism is in most instances inadvisable because it
interferes with well-grounded personal preferences. The second formulation is much
easier tojustify than the first. See, for example, essays in PATERNALISM (R. Sartorius ed.
1983).
42. It is necessary to make allowance for the handicapped,for example, who may find
it especially difficult to "clean up." But apart from this incapacity all are likely to be
equal in their capacity to do so. Although this kind of equality exists in cleaning up
situations, it is not to be expected in more complex settings, particularly those that
involve bargaining.
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important methodological distinctions. Each distinction deserves much more generous treatment.
A.

Description andJustification-The Use of Examples

What puts a commentator or theorist in position to say how
we should engage in moral judgment? In other words, is there
such a thing as "normative metaethics?" Presumably the first
job is descriptive: Moral judgment is a phenomenon on many
levels, on the level of action, emotion and feeling, and language. Persons act morally (or not), have moral feelings, and
make moral judgments about their actions and those of others.
It is a difficult job to get the description of moral judgment
right because it involves (1) uncovering the criteria of use for
many disparate moral terms, (2) determining the relationships
and so on,
"
among terms like "the right," "the good,' ..virtue,"
(3) seeing the ways in which some uses are consistent or controversial, (4) inquiring into the relationship of judgment and
action, and (5) exploring the ways in which feelings shape
moral action and judgment, the ways in which feelings are determined by human nature and by idiosyncratic experience,
and related issues. There is an additional conceptual gulf between public and private morality. The acts of the state, in their
moral significance, are not necessarily to be seen as the acts of
individuals writ large. The state dispenses justice in a different
way from individuals (if individuals dispense justice at all) and
the state makes possible the recognition of rights in a way that
is literally inconceivable in the unorganized collectivity of persons. All of this is the project of descriptive metaethics.
We speak of acts being justified morally (or justified in other
ways). We make judgments that use the term "justification."
But what could we possibly mean by saying that the system of
moral judgment as a whole is justified or not? What could we
possibly be using as a criterion, as a measure? How do we
"judge" judgment? At best we can say that the system ofjudgments has within it inconsistencies. If consistency is a norm, a
logical desideratum, then we can judge an inconsistent system
as flawed by that standard.
I am not certain whether Professor Cohen thinks he has offered ajustification for the system of moral judgment. Nor am I
clear about whether he thinks that wealth maximization is the
sort of external consideration, a fulcrum, that can be used to
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move or reform the system of moral judgment as a whole. It is
not even clear whether he thinks that reform is needed. He tells
us first that moral intuitions coincide with wealth maximization
as an ultimate norm and that there are no counterexamples. If
this is so, then he is simply making explicit what has been implicit in moral judgment. I have tried to argue that the case for
coincidence is never made and that the proposition is inherently implausible. Beyond this, it is clear that Professor Cohen
thinks some kind ofjustification for the system of moral judgment, something beyond description, is called for and that he
has given it. I do not understand what this job of "normative
metaethics" is in principle and therefore I do not understand
Professor Cohen's attempt to carry it out.
B.

Goal-Based and Rights-Based Morality

There is an important asymmetry between goal-based and
rights-based accounts of morality, or more generally between
teleological and deontological moral theories. Any theorist
must begin with certain intuitions about what is good and right.
These intuitions are the explananda, the things to be explained.
An account that invokes goals is an explanans, an explanation of
the intuitions. The explanation may or may not succeed. What
is in question is whether moral intuitions do or do not come
together under a particular goal or set of goals. Does all moral
conduct involve the pursuit of happiness, or are some pursuits
of happiness immoral? Is all wealth maximizing conduct moral,
or are some instances immoral? And so on. The idea that some
acts are moral in themselves regardless of whether they involve
the pursuit of the hypothesized goal is the residual idea we are
left with when the explanation in terms of goals fails. Thus a
deontological theory is not a separate kind of explanation; it is
left over when a teleological explanation is defeated by
examples.
Professor Cohen's disdain for serious consideration of examples suggests that he thinks goal-based theories in general and
wealth maximization in particular are more easily defended and
intuitively more obvious than in fact they are. In addition, the
attempt to show that they do not violate our intuitions about
rights, if it were carried out successfully, would not show that
they are in fact "rights-based," only that there is no friction
between theories of the two kinds. At the same time, Professor
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Cohen's conception of what we mean by "rights" is unacceptably narrow, extending at most to a timid representation of a
right to fairness. The job he takes upon himself is thus hardly
begun.

